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reserved.‘‘How can the state regulate the firms it also runs?’’
The Economist (22-01-2012, p. 17)1. Introduction
Three decades after the start of the largest transfer of ownership in the history of the corporation, privatization is fading
away. Since the turn of the century, the divestiture of state assets has slowed down in most developed economies and some-
how progressed in emerging countries due to the floating of large State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). However, the most com-
mon outcome of this worldwide process is the persisting government control of (partly) privatized firms, a qualifying feature
of the so-called ‘‘rise of state capitalism’’.1 Interestingly, and contrary to conventional wisdom, residual control rights by the
government do not affect negatively the value of the firm. Recent evidence has shown that partial, not full, privatizationitutions’’.
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Fig. 1. Market-to-book ratios at the IRA inception, before and after the event. (Sample: firms undergoing the change in regulatory regime; ownership
threshold at 30%.)
2 B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxximproves financial and operating performance (Gupta, 2005) and that firms under government control tend to be more valuable
than fully privatized firms (Beltratti et al., 2007; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009).
Public utilities, i.e. firms operating in network industries, such as energy, telecommunication, transportation, and water,
had a great bearing in past privatizations. In most developed countries, sales advanced in parallel with deep structural re-
forms promoting liberalization and regulation of former state monopolies to boost efficiency and private investment.2 In the
European Union, for example, the Commission urged the member states to establish Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs),
i.e. autonomous public agencies to which governments were to delegate regulatory policy. Yet, government control of priv-
atized/regulated firms is commonly observed also in public utilities.3
We observe that residual ownership by the government does not affect negatively the market value of regulated utilities:
higher state ownership is associated to higher firm value, but this happens only when the firm becomes subject to an IRA.
Fig. 1 illustrates the evolution of market-to-book ratios of European telecoms and energy utilities before and after the official
establishment of respective IRAs. We notice that, on average, in the 3-year period after the event, state-controlled firms out-
perform privately controlled firms by 15 percent.
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we investigate the effect of government ownership on the market value of public
utilities, controlling for other possible determinants. Second, should this relation exist, we try to establish the channel link-
ing government ownership to the value of firms regulated by IRAs. To this purpose, we use an original panel of 88 European
publicly traded network utilities from 1994 to 2005, which includes 10 of the top 30 companies in terms of market capital-
ization within the European Industrial Sector (Mediobanca Investment Bank, 2009). Our estimates rely on cross- and intra-
country variation in the data around regulatory reforms and political institutions.
Why should governments own firms? Conventional wisdom and a bulk of theoretical literature suggest that politicians
are ‘‘bad owners’’ of corporations as they typically impose objectives that destroy shareholders’ value (Shapiro and Willig,
1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Bennedsen, 2000).4 At the same time, politicians are also viewed as ‘‘bad regulators’’, since
their interference may lead to time-inconsistent regulatory decisions and to the expropriation of utilities’ sunk investments (Sti-
gler, 1971). These arguments typically provide the rationale for the privatization of SOEs, insofar as the transfer of ownership
rights to the private sector improves incentives and boosts operating performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001), and for the
setting up of IRAs, in order to foster the credibility of regulatory commitments (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Baldwin and Cave, 1999).
However, the existence of a legally (de jure) independent regulator is not sufficient to ensure real (de facto) independent
decisions, because genuine independence hinges, among other things, upon the actual powers that the political system del-
egates to the agency, in other words upon the residual rights to intervene in regulatory decisions retained by incumbent pol-
iticians.5 We label reluctant regulation the institutional setting whereby regulatory powers are delegated to a formally
independent regulator, but de facto subject to political interference by the government.
Reluctant regulation matters when the government retains significant ownership rights in regulated firms. In this case,
politicians may wield their powers to obtain favorable regulatory decisions that boost utilities’ profitability, and this in turn
allows the government, for example, to raise additional fiscal revenues via extra-dividends and to avoid tax increases,2 Utilities accounted for two thirds of the privatization revenues raised in European countries from 1977 to date (Privatization Barometer, 2010).
3 In the European Union, 85% of privatized utilities are under government control (Roland, 2008).
4 In this perspective, privatization can be seen as a safeguard against the opportunistic behavior of politicians (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). See also the
recent survey by Martimort (2006).
5 Alesina and Tabellini (2008), studying the normative criteria that allocate tasks between politicians and bureaucrats, point out that regulation of public
utilities is an example of ‘‘policies that lend themselves to bureaucratic delegation, since they pit special interests against those of consumers as a whole’’.
However, such a delegation comes to a cost in terms of the loss of political control over the industry leading to imperfect delegation of power. In fact,
‘‘institutions are more likely to be designed so as to deliver maximal rents at the lowest risk for the incumbent politician’’ (page 444 and 445).
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will give a ‘‘helping hand’’ indirectly via regulation boosts the market value of utilities under mixed (private–public) own-
ership, with private shareholders sharing the financial rent provided for by the public shareholder.
To establish the link between residual state ownership and regulated firms’ market value, we investigate the circum-
stances that make government interference and reluctant regulation possible, exploiting the heterogeneity in ownership
patterns and in regulatory settings. The seminal study by Levy and Spiller (1994) shows that political interference in regu-
latory decisions is more likely when the institutional constraints on discretionary executive power are weak. In this case,
political power can overturn administrative decisions and undermine the credibility of regulatory commitments. Formal
institutional arrangements that affect discretionary executive power typically include the explicit separation of powers,
i.e. an effective system of ‘‘checks and balances’’ between different branches of government, and an electoral system that
fosters party proliferation and political fragmentation. We thus predict reluctant regulation to surface where weak institu-
tional constraints provide the executive with incentives to retain higher stakes in regulated firms. Where, instead, the coun-
try’s institutional endowment fosters genuinely independent regulation, residual public ownership should not affect firm
value.6
Our empirical results show that residual state ownership positively affects the market value of firms regulated by IRAs
and suggest that this effect materializes where political institutions are not particularly effective in restraining government
power. In the instrumental variable model, where we account for the possible endogeneity of residual state ownership and
independent regulation, we find that state ownership appears as an important channel through which political institutions
indirectly affect the market valuation of regulated firms. Results continue to hold when we control for sector characteristics,
country specificity, different thresholds of state ownership, cultural aspects such as trust in society, and alternative measures
of institutional constraints on discretionary executive power, thus supporting the view that reluctant regulation is a funda-
mental driver of the performance of public utilities.
A few papers have addressed related issues, showing that political institutions are significant determinants of structural
reforms such as regulatory decisions (Duso, 2005; Guerriero, 2011; Hauge et al., 2012), market liberalization (Pitlik, 2007;
Potrafke, 2010; Duso and Seldeslachts, 2010) and privatization (Li and Xu, 2002; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009; Bjørnskov
and Potrafke, 2011; Dinc and Gupta, 2011).7
More specifically, Edwards and Waverman (2006) and Bortolotti et al. (2011; BCRS hereafter) have addressed the inter-
actions between state ownership and regulatory independence. Edwards and Waverman (2006), using a sample of 15 EU
incumbent telecom operators tracked from 1997 to 2003, show that public ownership positively affects wholesale rates, sug-
gesting that governments influence regulatory outcomes to favor incumbents in which they hold an ownership stake. How-
ever, this effect is mitigated in presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government.
BCRS (2011), using a panel of EU utilities, analyze how firm ownership and regulatory independence affect capital structure
and regulated prices. They find that privately-controlled firms are more highly leveraged than state-controlled firms if they
are regulated by an IRA and that the leverage of private firms has a positive and significant effect on regulated prices. While
these results are consistent with the theory that private regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory
outcomes (Spiegel and Spulber, 1994), they also suggest that state-controlled companies do not have to rely on such strategic
device.
The current paper draws on the same panel of firms, but departs from the analysis developed in BCRS and complements it
in several respects. First, while BCRS primarily aimed to test the strategic role of leverage to soften ex post regulatory oppor-
tunism, this paper investigates whether the quality of political institutions ultimately affects firm value via the imperfect
delegation of regulatory powers to IRA and partial privatization (i.e. reluctant regulation), fundamental aspects of structural
reforms in the European Union. Second, in this paper we use a continuous ownership variable that measure governments’
ultimate control rights (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009) while in BCRS we use a dummy variable to define the ownership status.
Third, differently from BRCS, the econometric analysis explicitly accounts for the potential endogeneity of institutional
reforms.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first empirical analysis on the impact of state ownership on regulated firms’ market
value in the EU introducing political institutions and the concept of reluctant regulation to explain this relation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional context. In Section 3, we present
our research design and estimation strategy. In Section 4, we describe our data, specifically the nature of the sample, firm
level data, and the regulatory, ownership and political variables. In Section 5, we present the empirical results from estimat-
ing the market value regression, while in Section 6 we account for the effect of different political settings. In Section 7, we
present the sensitivity analysis. Section 8 contains our conclusions.6 Our approach follows a political economy explanation of regulation and privatization. Under an alternative view, the regulator might be less willing to
expropriate ex post the regulated firm simply because he assigns a greater weight to firm profits than to consumer surplus either to promote investment
(Guerriero, 2011) or because political divergence between politicians and regulators (Strausz, 2011). Firm value would thus increase not due to reluctant
regulation but rather due to the regulator’s pro-firm attitude. However, in this alternative view, all firms, irrespective of their ownership, would benefit from
such regulatory policies, and therefore ownership should not matter at all.
7 In a different, but related field, Albalate et al. (2012) study the political institution determinants of the provision of public goods, with an application to
military spending.
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Following a big wave of nationalization after the Second World War, vertically integrated, stated-owned monopolies
have long dominated European network industries. Under such regime, utilities were an operational branch of the
government and instructed to provide universal services at low prices, absorb excess unemployment, and invest in infra-
structure. In turn, the government played the dual role of owner and ‘‘regulator’’, by setting tariffs, quality standards, and
investment levels. This arrangement however created ill-performing and highly inefficient public monopolies (Megginson
and Netter, 2001).
Starting from the mid 1980s in the UK, and early 1990s in the rest of Europe, the European Commission promoted gradual
liberalization and a regulatory process intended to improve the efficiency and service quality of European public utilities, as
well as increase their levels of investment. In particular, the European Commission enacted a number of directives aimed at
setting up a common regulatory framework for all EU member states, which were in turn required to embody such directives
into national legislation.
The most important of these EU-driven reforms may have been the institution of IRAs, charged with the duty to regulate
the activity of network industries and tame the potential conflict of interest between government and state-controlled util-
ities. Typically, delegated regulatory tasks involve price-setting decisions both at retail and wholesale levels – whenever ac-
cess to essential facility is needed to develop market competition, the definition of entry conditions, the imposition of quality
standards, and all the technical specifications to use or access existing infrastructures.
The IRAs ought to operate with their own specialized staff and according to a detailed mandate, independently of
ministries or other governmental departments. The European Commission especially urged governments of member
states to establish national independent regulators at least in crucial sectors like energy and telecommunications,
sometimes under the threat of opening infringement procedures before the European Court of Justice.8 Nevertheless,
the European Commission left the decision about the definition and the scope of the delegated powers in the hands
of national governments. This process of delegation led to the creation of formally independent (de jure) agencies.
However, de facto independence clearly depended on how this delegation process was implemented in each member
state. Indeed, agencies are usually not fully independent because national executives often retain ultimate responsibility
for their activities (Verhoest et al., 2012).
As for privatization, the European Commission left the ultimate decision about the ownership of regulated utilities in the
hands of national governments (see Bortolotti et al., 2003). As a result, after more than a decade, many large utilities in the
EU are still controlled by central and local governments, especially in France, Germany, and Italy, and particularly in the en-
ergy sector.
The implementation of these institutional reforms (modern regulation, privatization, market liberalization) varies con-
siderably across EU countries and industries. Table 1 reports the year in which an IRA was established, the timing of
transposition of sectoral directives in each member state, and the allocation of proceeds from privatization over time.
The data refer only to energy and telecoms, because in water supply and transport infrastructure a common regulatory
framework is still under construction, IRAs do not yet exist (so regulation is carried out by government committees or
within ministries) and privatization is lagging behind. As shown in Table 1, in most member states, privatizations in en-
ergy and telecoms followed the implementation of EC directives on the adoption of regulatory frameworks and the
inception of IRAs.
Implementation of reforms is well advanced in the telecom industry, where liberalization started in 1987 with the pub-
lication of the Green Paper for the Development of the Common Market for telecommunication services and equipment. The
Green Paper was followed by a sequence of directives, starting from Directive 90/388 on ‘‘Competition in the markets for
telecommunications services’’, which established the institution of national IRAs in each Member State. Table 1 shows that
independent regulatory agencies now operate in virtually all member states: in the UK the IRA was established in 1984,
while in the other EU countries IRAs were set up in the mid-90s. As for corporate ownership, at the onset of the liberalization
process the European Commission raised concerns about residual state ownership in telecoms companies.9 By 2005, most
telecom companies were (at least partially) privatized, and governments held control stakes only in the case of German and
Swedish incumbents.
Market liberalization reforms are well ahead also in the energy sector, where the majority of electric and gas utilities are
subject to regulation by an IRAs. The milestone legislation is Directive 96/92 for the electricity market, followed by Directive
98/30 for the gas market; these directives aimed at gradually introducing competition in power generation and retail seg-
ments, as well as at unbundling the various segments of the energy value chain. Importantly, these directives established
independent national regulatory agencies: the UK was again the first country in Europe to establish an IRA in 1989, while
other countries followed from 1995 to 2000, with Germany being the last one to set up an IRA for energy utilities in8 Recently, the European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Luxemburg, Romania and Slovakia regarding the telecoms authority’s
independence and its internal organization. See European Commission (2010, p. 44).
9 ‘‘In some Member States, concerns are reported that the structures in place do not ensure that regulatory decisions are not influenced by State ownership
considerations. In these cases, the necessary separation of the control of the incumbent and the regulatory powers should be re-examined (Belgium, Finland,
Luxembourg, Ireland, France)’’ (European Commission, 1999, p. 15). More recently, an OECD report still remarks: ‘‘with public enterprises often enjoying soft
budget constraints and state guarantees, the playing field is not level in markets where they operate’’ (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006, p. 6).
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Table 1
Timing of regulation and privatization in the energy and telecommunications sectors in European countries.
Country Energy (electricity and gas) Telecommunications
Date of
establishment
of IRA
Liberalization
reform in
electricity
(directive 96/
92)
Liberalization
reform in gas
(directive 98/
30)
Privatization
revenues in
energy raised
before the
transposition
directives (%)
Privatization
revenues in
energy raised
before the
establishment
of the IRA (%)
Date of
establishment
of IRA
Liberalization
reform in
telecoms
(directive 90/
388)
Privatization
revenues in
TLC raised
before the
transposition
directives (%)
Privatization
revenues in
TLC raised
before the
establishment
of IRA (%)
Italy 1995 1999 2000 30.52 0 1997 1997 5.72 5.72
UK 1989 2000 2000 100 18.60 1984 1997 94.84 3.07
Spain 1998 1997 1998 23.91 52.62 1996 1997 22.17 22.17
France 2000 2000 2003 2.54 2.54 1996 1996 2.24 2.24
Portugal 1995 1999 2006 66.58 12.94 2001 1997 31.19 100
Germany 2006 1998 2003 63.15 100 1996 1996 0 0
Netherlands 1998 1998 2001 16.11 0 1997 1998 42.84 41.86
Austria 2000 1998 2000 55.40 70.76 1997 1997 0 0
Sweden 1998 1997 2004 0 0 1992 1997 0 0
Finland 1995 1998 – 4.47 0.42 1987 1997 0.10 0
Greece 2000 1999 Failure to
transpose
2.40 0 1992 1999 50.20 0
Belgium 1999 2000 1999 10.12 10.12 1991 1997 79.33 0
Ireland 1999 1999 2000 – – 1997 1996 0 0
Denmark 1999 1996 2001 0 0 2002 1996 48.54 100
B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 52006. As regards ownership, the only fully privatized energy utilities are British. At the opposite side stands the French gov-
ernment, which, with its more than 80% stake in both Gaz de France and Electricitè de France (and the 32% stake in Telecom
France), appears as the most reluctant to release its hold in regulated utilities.
Finally, in water supply and in transportation infrastructure (docks and ports, airports and freight motorways) structural
reforms still lag behind. With the exception of the UK, most water and transportation utilities are still controlled by central
and local governments and subject to regulation by ministries or other branches of the government rather than by indepen-
dent regulatory agencies.
3. Research design
3.1. Theoretical framework
Our initial question is: how does ownership affect firm value when an IRA is in place?
When there is not an IRA in place, self-interested politicians may exploit state-controlled utilities to extract political rents
from over-investment and excess-employment programs that typically result in low profitability and inefficiency (see for
example Megginson and Netter, 2001). In this case, private investors will typically shun state-controlled regulated firms.
The establishment of IRAs – such as the process promoted by the European Commission during the 1990s – functionally
separates the (dual) role of the state as typical large shareholder of utilities and as regulator of the industry. The delegation
act shifts the regulatory powers from the political sphere to an independent bureaucratic entity, curbing ex ante political
interference and opportunistic behavior by self-interested politicians (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Armstrong and Sappington,
2007). In sum, credible regulation boils down to restraining the power of the executive to expropriating the utilities’ invest-
ment (see the survey by Spiller (2004)).
In theory, if regulators were de facto independent, they should be able to thwart interference by politicians, regardless of
the private or public ownership of the firm (Laffont and Tirole, 1986; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). When regulators are de
iure but not de facto independent, politicians still wield regulatory powers and influence regulatory decision (Armstrong and
Sappington, 2006) providing them with the incentives to retain stakes in the regulated firms. By keeping regulators on their
toes, politicians can obtain favorable treatment of state controlled utilities (i.e. higher tariffs, higher entry barriers, delaying
the unbundling of the network, softer budget constraints etc.) that eventually enables them to extract economic or financial
rents, such as dividends to be used to finance the budget deficit.10 Thanks to the indirect protection against the risk of expro-
priation of a utility’s sunk investment, private investors in the equity market will positively value the presence of the state as
shareholder (Perotti, 1995), as they expect to share the benefits of a soft regulatory stance with the government.11 This10 For example, Gugler (2003) finds that state-controlled firms are found to smooth and payout dividends significantly more than privately controlled firms.
11 Empirical evidence confirms the government ‘‘helping hand’’ even in recent years. Glowicka (2006) finds that distressed EU state controlled firms are more
likely to receive long-term government aids than privately controlled companies. Borisova et al. (2011) find that investors view government ownership as an
implicit assurance of repayment and protection against bankruptcy. Finally, Borisova and Megginson (2011) comparing corporate bonds of fully and partially
privatized firms, show that a one-percentage-point increase in domestic government ownership is associated with lower credit spreads – used as a proxy for
the cost of debt – of roughly three-quarters of a basis point.
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independent IRAs, i.e. in the regime that we label as reluctant regulation.12
Following this argument, the relevant research question becomes: under what conditions has state ownership a positive
impact on firm value? Our working hypothesis is that reluctant regulation is more likely to appear where political institution
constraints are not binding and the administrative discretionality of regulators is jeopardized. More generally, we argue that
this will occur where the institutional countervailing powers are weak and where the political system provides governments
with more latitude to intervene on administrative decisions, such as those taken by independent authorities or agencies.13 To
test this hypothesis, we have looked for proxies that describe the extent to which executive power is constrained by formal
institutional arrangements, and we predict that in those countries where such constraints are in place, regulators are less likely
to be subject to political interference and state ownership does not positively affect firm value.
The recent political economy literature has developed a vast array of variables capturing the formal institutional arrange-
ments that curb executive discretionary executive power or make policy reversals less likely (see, among others, Acemoglu,
2005; Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Persson, 2002). With reference to regulated network industries, Levy and Spiller (1994)
emphasize that the credibility of regulatory policy depends on the structure and organization of political institutions, so that
political interference with regulation can be staved off by an effective system of ‘‘checks and balances’’. Spiller and Urbizt-
ondo (1994) show that in systems characterized by divided governments, regulatory agencies are more likely to be indepen-
dent, thus suggesting that variables describing the electoral system are also appropriate. In this view, majority rule systems,
characterized by stronger (unified) governments, are more likely to expose regulatory authorities to the risk of interference
and unexpected policy changes. In contrast, proportional electoral systems that lead to party proliferation and political frag-
mentation are thought to hinder the decision-making process, making policy changes less likely, and this would, in turn, en-
hance the independence of regulators.
Alternative explanations could be set forth to explain why market value should be higher at state-controlled firms, such
as that they are for some reason more efficient or better managed than privately-controlled firms. For example, Laffont and
Tirole (1991) show that within state owned (‘‘public’’) firms, managers whose objectives are more aligned with those of the
government- regulator better internalize investment incentives. In this scenario, state owned firms’ managers would exert
higher effort in cost reduction with respect to private firms’ who ‘‘respond to two masters – the regulator and the sharehold-
ers’’ (p. 85) and have their incentives diluted. On the other hand, managers in public enterprises might be forced to redeploy
their investment to serve social goals, which also leads to ex post expropriation and dilutes investment incentives. In sum,
Laffont and Tirole (1991) conclude: ‘‘these two insights have ambiguous implications for the relative cost efficiency of the
public and private sectors; theory alone is thus unlikely to be conclusive in this respect’’ (p. 103). All in all, the view that
state-controlled firms may be more efficient than privately controlled firms is quite controversial, let alone not supported
by the empirical evidence (see, among the others, Megginson and Netter, 2001). To cite a few influential articles, Kornai
et al. (2003) show that public enterprises have less incentives to minimize production costs, Hart et al. (1997) conclude that
they are generally less cost efficient than private companies, for example due to excessive use of the labor input (as in Pint
(1991) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). Back to our paper, should state-controlled utilities have higher market to book ratios
because they are more efficient, there should be no difference between their market value under strong or weak political
institutions (in other words, political institutions should not matter at all).
3.2. Empirical modeling
The theoretical framework developed in the previous section provides the hypotheses to be tested by our econometric
analysis. We focus on the empirical relation between firm market value (as measured by the market-to-book ratio) and ulti-
mate control rights held by the government in the presence of IRAs (as measured by a dummy variable) vis-à-vis executive-
branch regulators or ministries.
Estimation of this relationship raises a number of econometric issues: reverse causality, measurement errors, omitted
variables, and specification of the functional form. First, government’s residual ownership is likely to be endogenous because
expectations on payouts and investment opportunities affect privatization decisions. Second, a reverse causality problem
may affect also the IRA dummy, since the government may have an incentive to set up the IRA in sectors where profitability
is expected to be higher. Third, the IRA dummy is an imperfect measure of regulatory independence, since it only denotes the
presence of a regulatory authority and not the degree of its independence. Fourth, as we deal with a heterogeneous pool of
utilities that operate in various sectors and countries, we have to include firm-, country- and industry-specific controls, next
to the usual firm- and time-fixed effects, in order to account for relevant factors that make policy variables potentially12 Under imperfect delegation of powers to the IRA, the politician may also extract the rent from the regulated firm through bribes. In this case, the politician
would not have incentives to retain stakes in the firm. We would thus expect to see full privatization cum reluctant regulation where corruption is more
widespread (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). However, this alternative equilibrium is less likely to occur in developed economies such as the European countries for
which this theoretical framework is designed.
13 The important role of legal and political institutions for regulatory commitment and decisions is also examined by Armstrong and Sappington (2006) who
argue: ‘‘When legal institutions are weak, pressure groups may anticipate substantial benefits from convincing the regulator to renege on the promises he has
made to the firm’’ (p. 339). In contrast, ‘‘Strong legal institutions can thwart attempts by other government agencies to intervene in the day-to-day operations
of the regulatory agency and can thereby enhance a regulator’s commitment powers by reducing the likelihood that the terms of announced regulatory policies
will be changed’’ (p. 338). Similarly, according to Alesina and Tabellini (2008) bureaucrats/regulators ‘‘perform well [. . .] if the legal system is strong’’ (p. 444).
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ship stakes in regulated firms, a linear specification is incorrect and we must also include the interaction between the own-
ership variable and the IRA dummy, as well as to treat the resulting term as potentially endogenous.
The empirical strategy we employ to estimate the impact of residual state ownership on regulated firms’ market value is
the following: we begin with OLS (fixed-effect) regressions, where we enter the ownership variable both linearly and inter-
actively with the IRA dummy. We then investigate whether the estimated coefficient of the interaction between state own-
ership and IRA differs across sub-samples characterized by institutional arrangements with differential ability to constrain
government and politicians’ discretionality. To control for cross-sector heterogeneity, we estimate the model both for the full
sample and a sub-sample of energy and telecom firms. Moreover, given the quite complex nature of the dataset – each obser-
vation is one particular firm, in one particular industry, in one particular year – and of the correlation structure of the error
term, we report standard errors’ estimates that are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within-group serial correlation, clus-
tering observations at the firm- and at the industry-level. Finally, we try to establish through which channel government
shareholding affects firm value with an identification strategy that uses specific political–institutional variables as instru-
ments for state ownership, regulation and their interaction.
3.3. Identification and instrumental variables
Under a regime of reluctant regulation, the power of governments to interfere with regulatory policy produces economic
rents that boost the market value of partially privatized firms. The credibility of regulatory commitment therefore hinges
upon the ability of the political system to protect regulatory independence.
Our identification strategy is based on the assumption that political institutions affect both the extent of governments’
residual regulatory powers and the size of the stake retained in public utilities.
To find suitable instruments, we rely on political economy variables identified by the literature as potentially relevant for
the credibility of regulatory commitments. Therefore, to account for the number of decision-makers whose agreement is
needed to revise policies and reforms, our first political economy instrument is Checks & Balances, a time-varying index,
available in the World Bank DPI-Database on Political Institutions, that ranges from 0 to 7 (from low to high checks and bal-
ances). The index is a measure of the number of veto players in a political system adjusted for the respective independence of
veto players in ‘‘divided’’ government, in presidential systems, or minority or coalition governments in proportional systems
(Beck et al., 2001, pp. 169–170).14
The second political variable accounts for the electoral rules, whether they lead to party proliferation or aggregation with-
in the Parliamentary system (Lijphart, 1999). As shown by Levy and Spiller (1994) and Henitsz and Zelner (2001), in highly
fragmented political systems and divided governments, policies and reforms are less likely to be revoked due to a large num-
ber of institutional actors with potential veto power. In this case, politicians are less likely to interfere with regulatory deci-
sions, and regulators should be – at least in principle – more independent (see also Spiller and Urbiztondo, 1994). In contrast,
unified and cohesive governments that are the typical outcome of majority rule electoral systems are thought to have more
room to interfere with regulatory decisions. We use the electoral Disproportionality Index (G) developed by Gallagher (1991)
and updated by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) according to the following formula:14 Thi
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rwhere vi is the share of votes obtained by party i in general elections, si is the seat share of the party i, and N is the total
number of parties in the legislature. The index, is continuous and time varying; it equals zero when there is perfect propor-
tionality between seats and votes and it increases, on average, as the electoral system moves towards majority rule. By posi-
tioning country-years in a political spectrum that ranges from majority rule to the so-called ‘‘consensus’’ model of
democracy (Spolaore, 2004), the index provides a measure of political fragmentation. Lower electoral disproportionality is
usually associated with a higher number of parties in the legislature as well as in the government, and more stable govern-
ments (Lijphart, 1999).
The set of instruments includes three additional political economy variables that may help explaining the pace of priv-
atization and regulatory reforms. The Political Orientation Indexmeasures governments’ political preferences in the right-left
political spectrum. As shown by Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), Potrafke (2010) and Duso and Seldeslachts (2010), the political
orientation of governments is a significant determinant of structural market reforms. The index ranges from 0 (extreme left
wing) to 10 (extreme right wing) and varies over time. It is the weighted average of the right-left political orientation scores
of the parties forming the executive branch of government, where the weights are the number of parliamentary seats held by
each party divided by the total number of parliamentary seats held by the ruling coalition as a whole (see Huber and Ingle-
hart, 1995, updated by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008)). Government Stability is a time-varying survey-based measure that cap-
tures the extent of turnover of a government’s key decision makers in any year. It ranges from 0 (low stability) to 1 (high
stability). Election date is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a general election in that year. It is included to see whether the insti-
tution of the IRA was motivated by an electoral, and thus a political, change. Government Stability and Election Date are boths measure has been widely used in the literature (see, among the others, Keefer and Knack, 2007).
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set of instruments is available, we estimate an over-identified model and, by testing that our instruments do not have a di-
rect impact on firm value beyond the effect they exert on the endogenous variables (see, for example, Persson et al., 2007;
Tabellini, 2010), we can tentatively isolate the channel through which political institutions affect market value.
4. The sample and the data
For the empirical analysis we use an unbalanced panel of 88 publicly traded utilities and transportation infrastructure
operators from EU 15 member states, tracked from 1994 to 2005. All firms operate in regulated sectors, i.e. where entry
and prices are subject to regulatory oversight either by the state through its ministries, government committees, local gov-
ernments or by a formally established IRA. Many of these utilities, while being publicly traded on a stock exchange, are par-
tially owned by the government. The regulated sectors include electric and natural gas utilities (distribution and
transmission), water supply companies, fixed-line telecoms, freight road concessionaires, and transport infrastructure oper-
ators such as ports and airport authorities.
The data comprise a diversified set of firms operating in a wide array of industries that either have always been under the
supervision of an IRA (such as UK energy, telecom and water companies), or have never been subject to an IRA (freight roads
concessionaries, ports and docks, airports and water companies in all Europe except for the UK), or that become regulated by
an IRA during the sample period. Although in the empirical analysis we control heterogeneity by including firm fixed effects,
one might worry that the different institutional and regulatory environment faced by firms (independent authorities, na-
tional ministries, local governments or some executive branch committee) might somehow bias our results. To address this
concern, we conduct the econometric analysis both on the complete, but more heterogeneous sample, as well as on the more
homogeneous (i.e. subject to IRAs and to similar EU-prompted market reforms) sub-sample of energy (electricity and gas)
utilities and telecom companies. This sub-sample comprises 57 firms – 15 fixed telecom operators and 42 energy companies.
To measure regulatory independence, we use a dummy that is equal to 1 in all years in which the firm was subject to an
IRA, and 0 otherwise (i.e. when it is regulated by an executive-branch committee). The IRA dummy was constructed using
data and information on IRAs’ inception dates taken from Gilardi (2005) for energy and telecommunications. As shown in
Table 1, the UK introduced an IRA in 1984 for the telecom industry and in 1989 for the energy sector, while most countries
established IRAs as late as in the mid-1990s (from 1995 to 2000). We have complemented this data with additional infor-
mation about the presence of IRAs in the other sectors drawn from other sources. We have found that only the water indus-
try in the UK has an independent regulatory agency. Overall, 60 firms (57 energy and telecom operators plus three UK water
supply companies) are subject to an IRA while 28 are regulated by a government committee or ministry.
For all firms, we identify and track ultimate control rights (UCR) held by the state over time, following the weakest link
approach.15 According to this approach, the UCR of the state is simply equal to the minimum ownership stake along a chain (i.e.,
the weakest link). In the case of multiple chains, UCRs are added up across all chains. As Fig. 2 shows, privatized utilities often
display complex ownership structures, with pyramiding often used to separate share ownership and control.
Government UCR is the continuous, time-varying variable that we use to measure state ownership in the econometric
analysis. Many firms in our sample were partially privatized over the period, in the sense that governments gradually sold
shares over time, but retained significant stakes in such firms. Only 19 firms (16 UK companies) have fallen 100% under pri-
vate control in the period considered,16 while in 69 firms (out of a total of 88) ultimate control rights by the state have changed
over time.
To throw more light on ownership effects in our sample, we have constructed a dichotomous variable UCR_30% for each
firm-year observation, taking the value of UCR_30% = 1 when the state’s ultimate control rights are equal to or above 30%, and
0 otherwise. Using the dummy UCR_30% to classify ownership status, we observe that 42 of the 88 firms are privately-con-
trolled (i.e. with a value of government UCR of less than 30%) throughout the period, 26 are state-controlled, and 20 were
‘‘privatized’’ – i.e. UCR has fallen below 30% over the time-period.
In Table 2, for the ten largest telecom and energy utilities, we report the date of the IPO, the year since when they have
been operating under an IRA, overall market capitalization, and Government UCR as of 2005. Notably, IRAs in energy industry
were introduced later than in telecommunications, mostly around 2000. The privatization process has progressed unevenly
across countries: it lags behind in France and Germany, but it is more advanced in Spain and the UK where most of the firms
sampled have been under private control during the period under consideration. More in detail, we note that 4 out of 14
fixed-line telecom operators were fully privatized by 2005 whereas two, in Germany and Sweden, were still controlled by
the state with a stake larger than 50%. Among energy operators, UK companies are fully privatized, E.ON (Germany) and Iber-
dola (Spain) have government UCR below 5%, while the two France operators are still owned by the state with a share larger
than 80% (as of 2005).
Accounting and financial firm-level data have been collected from Worldscope. As a measure of firm value, we use the
market-to-book ratio (MTB). MTB is calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity15 The ‘‘weakest link’’ is widely used in the literature to measure control rights. See La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and
Bortolotti and Faccio (2009).
16 To account for the peculiarity of the UK firms’ sample, we re-estimate our preferred specifications after excluding UK companies from the analysis (see
Section 7 and Table 10).
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Fig. 2. The evolution of the government control rights in EU utilities: the case of Telecom Portugal.
B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 9divided by the total assets. The market value of equity is computed by multiplying the number of outstanding shares at the
end of the relevant year by the share price at that date converted into U.S. dollars. Other key variables for the analysis of
market-to-book ratios are the log of real total assets to control for size, the ratio of EBIT (earnings before interests and taxes)
to total assets, which is a proxy for profitability and ‘‘efficiency’’, and the book leverage, defined as total financial debt di-
vided by the sum of book equity and total financial debt.17
To control for industry-specific factors that may influence firm value through changes in market structure and in com-
petitive pressures within public utility sectors, we have included the OECD Index of Liberalization, a time-varying measure
obtained from the OECD International Regulation database by Conway and Nicoletti (2006). The index is an average of sev-
eral indicators, such as entry barriers, vertical integration and other features of the industry structure, and ranges from 0 to 6
(larger numbers indicate a lower degree of openness). Because the original index includes a sub-indicator for state owner-
ship of the relevant firms in each industry, to avoid collinearity with our own measure of government ownership (Govern-
ment UCR), we excluded this component and recomputed the average for the remaining OECD sub-indicators. The time-
varying nature of the index reflects the changing conditions of the utility services’ provision, such as the degree of market
opening in different sectors. In turn, this can help capturing potential differences in demand elasticity across sectors as long
as competitive conditions change over time.
We also control for key features of the financial and macroeconomic environment of the different EU countries. We use
the Investor Protection index, i.e. the ‘‘anti-director rights’’ index developed by La Porta et al. (1999) and updated by Pagano
and Volpin (2005) as proxy for the extent of protection and enforcement of investor rights. The index is time varying and
goes from 0 to 7 as shareholders’ rights become more protected. We expect higher values of this index to be associated with
lower cost of equity and hence higher market value (see, for example, La Porta et al., 2002). Debt to GDP is the ratio of total
(domestic and foreign) government debt to GDP in a given year (our source here is the OECD Structural Analysis Database).
Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) include this ratio to control for a given country’s fiscal conditions. Finally, we include GDP
Growth to account for country specific differences in macroeconomic conditions over time. Table 3 summarizes the descrip-
tive statistics for the variables used in the analysis both for the full sample (Panel A) and for the sub-sample of energy and
telecom companies (Panel B).
Fig. 1 shows the average market-to-book ratios for private and state controlled firms from 3 years before the IRA was set
up to 3 years after the IRA establishment, using 57 energy and telecom firms. If we define companies as state-controlled
when Government UCR is equal to or greater than 30%, we notice that average market-to-book ratio of state controlled firms
is lower before the switch (year 0), but starts growing thereafter, so that in the second and third year after the IRA was estab-
lished, is definitively larger:+20% and +15%, respectively. In contrast, the average MTB of private companies decreased from
1.33, at the regime switch, to 1.22 three years later.
5. The effect of state ownership on the market value of regulated firms
We estimate the following regression:17 The
numera
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tor of Market-to-Book and in the denominator of market leverage.
cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
6/j.jce.2012.12.003
Table 2
The top 20 European regulated companies by market capitalization.
Company name Country Date of establishment
of an IRA
IPO year Market capitalization
(US$bn, end 2005)
Government control
rights (end 2005)
Panel A: Telecommunications
Telefonica de Espana SA Spain 1996 1987 71.88 0.000
Deutsche Telekom AG Germany 1996 1996 69.74 0.575
France Telecom France 1996 1997 64.58 0.324
Telecom Italia SpA Italy 1997 1997 56.04 0.000
British Telecommunications PLC UK 1984 1991 33.02 0.000
Telia Sonera AB Sweden 1992 2000 24.10 0.590
Koninklijke KPN NV Netherlands 1997 1994 21.32 0.078
TeleDanmark AS Denmark 2002 1994 11.64 0.000
Portugal Telecom SA Portugal 2001 1995 11.27 0.127
Telekom Austria AG Austria 1997 2000 10.83 0.302
Panel B: Energy
Electricité de France France 2000 2005 68.88 0.873
E.ON Germany 2006 1987 68.14 0.048
Enel Italy 1995 1999 48.29 0.322
RWE Germany 2006 1922 41.47 0.310
Suez France 2000 1987 39.10 0.197
Vivendi France 2000 2000 36.00 0.124
British Gas PLC UK 1989 1986 35.03 0.000
Gaz de France France 2000 2005 28.80 0.801
National Grid Transo PLC UK 1989 1995 28.67 0.000
Iberdola Spain 1998 1992 24.60 0.020
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10.101MTBit ¼ a0 þ a1GovernmentUCRi;t1 þ a2IRAi;t1 þ a3GovernmentUCRi;t1  IRAi;t1 þ a4Xi;t1 þ a5Y i;t þ li þ kt
þ eit ; ð1ÞwhereMTBit is theMarket-to-Book ratio of firm i in year t, GovernmentUCRi,t1 is the 1-year lag of the continuous government
ultimate control rights variable, IRAi,t1 is the 1 year lag of the IRA dummy, GovernmentUCRi,t1  IRAi,t1 is the interaction
term that allows us to test for the effect of residual state ownership when the IRA is in place,18 Xit1 is a vector of firm-specific
variables, Yit is a vector of industry- and country-specific variables, li and kt are firm and year fixed effects while eit is an error
term. The vector of firm controls in this regression includes the Log of Real Total Assets, the EBIT-to-Total Assets ratio, and the
firm’s financial Leverage.19 The vector of industry and country controls includes the sectoral OECD Index of Market Liberalization,
the Investor Protection index, the Debt to GDP ratio and GDP growth. To reduce at least partly possible reverse causality, we lag all
firm variables 1 year and we add firm-specific fixed effects to filter out unobserved firm heterogeneity that is constant over time
(in Section 6.2 we present the instrumental variable results).
In Table 4, we present the OLS fixed-effect coefficients for the full sample of EU regulated utilities (Columns (1) and (2))
and for the sub-sample of 57 regulated energy and telecom firms which, following the EC directives, implemented the new
regulatory regime at some point in time – mostly from 1996 to 2000 (Columns (3) and (4)). We report robust standard errors
that are clustered at the firm and industry level in round and square brackets respectively.
Results show that market-to-book is negatively correlated with firm size and Debt to GDP ratio and that, for the full sam-
ple, market value is larger when profitability is higher, investor rights are better protected by the law and GDP grows faster.
In Columns (3) and (4), for the sub-sample of energy and telecom companies, the OECD Index of Liberalization does not enter
with a significant coefficient. We do not include this variable for the full sample in Columns (1) and (2) because the index is
not available for about one third of the firms, namely transportation infrastructure operators (ports and airports) and water
supply companies and if we enter it, the estimating sample would be almost indistinguishable from the energy-telecom sub-
sample. However, because the OECD Liberalization index allows us to control for potentially relevant sector specific omitted
variables, we will include it in the remainder of the analysis, which focuses on energy and telecom companies.20
Turning to the variables of interest for this paper, we find that, in Column (1), neither state ownership nor the IRA dummy
has, separately, a significant effect. When we add the interaction between Government UCR and IRA (Column (2)), we find that
the coefficient on Government UCR is significantly negative, while its interaction with IRA is positive and highly significant.
The positive coefficient on interacted terms suggests that when the IRA is in place, the larger the share held by the state, the
higher the firm’s market value. In Columns (3) and (4), the results for the control variables are less precisely estimated, prob-
ably due to the exclusion of firms that either were subjected to an IRA from the start or never became subject to an IRA,milar approach was used by Kwoka (2002, 2006) to investigate the differences between the prices charged by private and public US electric utilities and
st efficiency.
s specification is rather standard in the literature (see, for example, Morck et al., 1988; Lang et al., 1996).
thank one Referee for this suggestion.
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Table 3
Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. Obs.
Panel A: Full sample
Market-to-Book 1.389 0.489 0.572 4.352 765
Book Leverage 0.272 0.215 0 1 763
Log of Real Total Asset 11.003 1.803 5.694 14.506 765
EBIT-to-Total Asset 0.074 0.105 1.948 0.299 755
Government’s UCR 0.271 0.302 0 1 765
Independence Regulatory Agency dummy 0.605 0.489 0 1 765
Investor Protection Index 3.935 1.197 1 5 765
GDP Growth 2.446 1.372 1.12 10.72 765
Checks and balances Index 3.780 0.927 2 7 765
Political Constraints Index 0.743 0.078 0.363 0.894 765
Disproportionality Index 10.334 7.830 0.428 33.739 765
Political Orientation Index 5.762 1.517 3.665 8.025 765
Public Debt to GDP Ratio 0.673 0.262 0.273 1.243 723
Distrust 0.348 0.099 0.100 0.665 765
Panel B: Sub sample of energy and telecom firms
Market-to-Book 1.389 0.472 0.572 4.352 493
Book Leverage 0.311 0.211 0 1 492
Log of Real Total Asset 11.538 1.551 6.680 14.506 493
EBIT-to-Total Asset 0.068 0.120 1.948 0.299 483
Government’s UCR 0.285 0.285 0 1 493
Independence Regulatory Agency dummy 0.799 0.401 0 1 493
Investor Protection Index 3.817 1.163 1 5 493
GDP Growth 2.417 1.434 1.12 10.72 493
Checks and balances Index 3.836 0.937 2 7 493
Political Constraints Index 0.752 0.071 0.363 0.894 493
Disproportionality Index 8.943 7.238 0.428 33.739 493
Political Orientation Index 5.806 1.501 3.665 8.025 493
Public Debt to GDP Ratio 0.677 0.253 0.273 1.243 469
Distrust 0.351 0.100 0.100 0.665 493
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positive and significant and, in Column (4), when we estimate the effect of public ownership under an IRA, we find that
the stand alone GovernmentUCR variable is no longer significant whereas the interaction term GovernmentUCR  IRA is posi-
tive and significant (as it is in the full sample).
When we look at the total impact of state ownership on market value when the IRA is in place, as measured by
a1 + a3  [IRA = 1], we find that the sum of coefficients is insignificant for the full sample in Column (2), but highly significant
for the energy and telecom companies in Column (4) (p-values of the tests are reported at the bottom of all tables). This latter
result is consistent with the descriptive evidence reported in Fig. 1, which shows a large increase in market value for partially
state owned firms when they become subject to the IRA.
In the next section, we interpret this finding, analyzing its political economy implications.
6. State ownership and firm value: the role of political institutions
Our next step is to examine the drivers that explain the positive impact of residual state ownership on firm value when an
IRA exists. In Section 3, we argued that the quality of a country’s political institutions affects the propensity of governments
to tamper with regulatory policy. To implement an empirical test, we first investigate whether the response ofMTB ratios to
different regulatory and ownership regimes differs across different political institutions as represented by two country-
specific indices: Checks and Balances and Disproportionality (Section 6.1). We then address the endogeneity of Government
UCR, IRA and of their interaction by incorporating the effect of political institutions straight into a specific identifying
assumption, namely that Checks and Balances and Disproportionality are valid instruments in our regression model
(Section 6.2). Finally, we present a first set of robustness checks to address the potential endogeneity of the OECD Index of
Liberalization and to control for cultural aspects such as trust in society (Section 6.3).
6.1. Political institutions: evidence from sub-samples
In this Section, we focus on the sub-sample of 57 energy and telecom companies and report the corresponding results for
the full sample in the Appendix A. We split the sample based on Checks and Balances (C&B) in Table 5, and Disproportionality
in Table 6. These indexes allow for institutional changes over time, so that firms may shift from ‘‘high’’ to ‘‘low’’ categories.Please cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
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Table 4
Market value, government ownership and IRA–OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets  Book Value of
Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). Government UCR is a continuous variable constructed by Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), which uses the weakest
link approach to measure the State’s ultimate control rights. IRA is a dummy equal to 1 if an independent regulatory agency (IRA) is in place and is equal to 0
otherwise. The explanatory variables are defined in Section 4. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial
correlation. Errors are clustered at firm (round parentheses) and sector (square parentheses) level.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio Full sample Telecoms and Energy sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leveraget1 0.072 0.062 0.096 0.092
(0.106) (0.106) (0.264) (0.260)
[0.096] [0.096] [0.214] [0.206]
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.217 0.206 0.606 0.584
(0.130)* (0.125)* (0.487) (0.461)
[0.112]* [0.108]* [0.475] [0.444]
Log of real total assetst1 0.201 0.192 0.323 0.318
(0.074)*** (0.076)*** (0.132)** (0.130) **
[0.072]*** [0.075]*** [0.125]*** [0.123]***
Investor Protectiont 0.070 0.060 0.037 0.025
(0.036)* (0.035)* (0.094) (0.079)
[0.041]* [0.040] [0.081] [0.068]
GDP Growtht 0.078 0.085 0.001 0.020
(0.035)** (0.034)** (0.046) (0.044)
[0.035]** [0.035]* [0.050] [0.047]
Debt/GDPt 0.666 0.723 1.111 1.203
(0.391)* (0.378)* (0.647)* (0.671) *
[0.425] [0.409]* [0.714] [0.743]
OECD Index of Liberalizationt – – 0.012 0.002
– – (0.057) (0.054)
– – [0.051] [0.046]
Government UCRt1 (a1) 0.114 0.283 1.207 0.484
(0.155) (0.131)** (0.671)* (0.433)
[0.145] [0.134]** [0.711]* [0.487]
IRAt1 (a2) 0.036 0.067 0.163 0.146
(0.083) (0.098) (0.124) (0.122)
[0.082] [0.098] [0.118] [0.122]
Government UCRt1 * IRAt1 (a3) – 0.404 – 1.035
– (0.192)** – (0.465)**
– [0.223]* – [0.459]**
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
a1 + a3 – 0.121 – 1.519
– (0.226) – (0.764)**
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 – 0.593 – 0.046
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 – 0.028 – 0.027
R squared 0.261 0.269 0.195 0.207
F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N. firms [N. Obs.] 88 [696] 88 [696] 57 [451] 57 [451]
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
12 B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxxTo classify country-years observations with strong countervailing powers, we refer to values of the C&B index at the top
quartile of its distribution – more specifically, when C&B is greater than 4 (and symmetrically, for observations with C&B less
than or equal to 4). Based on country averages, we note that Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Germany exhibit the highest
scores while Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy the lowest. Fig. 3 reports the index trends for selected countries respectively at
the top and bottom ends of the distributions, i.e. Denmark and Germany, Spain and Italy.
The empirical results in Table 5 are consistent with our predictions. In countries where institutional checks and balances
are weaker, larger stakes of government ownership lead to higherMTB ratios. The coefficients on IRA and GovernmentUCR are
insignificant in the linear specification in Column (1), but when we add the interactive term in Column (2), we find that Gov-
ernmentUCR enters with a negative sign, GovernmentUCR  IRAwith a positive sign and both are highly significant. The results
strikingly differ when we turn to the sub-sample in which countervailing powers are supposed to keep the executive’s dis-
cretion more in check (see Columns (3) and (4)). Here, the IRA dummy enters with a positive and significant coefficient, sug-
gesting that where IRAs are expected to act independently (as per EC directives) capital markets attach a premium to the
reduced regulatory uncertainty that follows from regulatory commitment (see Cambini and Rondi, 2011, for evidence on
fixed investment). Moreover both GovernmentUCR and GovernmentUCR  IRA are now negatively correlated with firm value,Please cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
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Table 5
The role of political institutions: checks and balances – OLS estimates. Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is the Market-to-
Book ratio defined as (Total Assets  Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). Checks & Balances (C&B) is a time-varying index, ranging from
0 to 7, that measures the number of veto powers in the political system according to specific legislative and executive indexes of electoral competitiveness
(World Bank Database on Political Institutions). The explanatory variables are defined in Section 4. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. Errors are clustered at firm (round parentheses) and sector (square parentheses) level.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio Checks and balances
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low C&B Low C&B High C&B High C&B
Leveraget1 0.150 0.171 0.217 0.169
(0.142) (0.141) (0.213) (0.243)
[0.130] [0.135] [0.195] [0.222]
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.253 0.237 0.834 1.209
(0.147) * (0.131) * (0.848) (0.943)
[0.101]** [0.083]*** [0.808] [0.904]
Log of real total assetst1 0.216 0.229 0.025 0.090
(0.089) ** (0.085) *** (0.187) (0.165)
[0.083]*** [0.079]*** [0.186] [0.163]
Investor Protectiont 0.046 0.033 0.211 0.171
(0.055) (0.048) (0.168) (0.199)
[0.033] [0.029] [0.187] [0.221]
GDP Growtht 0.029 0.026 0.047 0.001
(0.025) (0.023) (0.074) (0.069)
[0.025] [0.022] [0.073] [0.067]
Debt/GDPt 1.197 1.240 0.729 0.726
(0.534) ** (0.500) ** (1.767) (1.576)
[0.657]* [0.621]** [1.810] [1.613]
OECD Index of Liberalizationt 0.097 0.101 0.238 0.205
(0.058) * (0.056) * (0.055) *** (0.068) ***
[0.040]** [0.038]*** [0.058]*** [0.070]***
Government UCRt1 (a1) 0.067 0.522 1.102 1.074
(0.172) (0.223) ** (0.685) * (0.558) *
[0.150] [0.254]** [0.684] [0.560]*
IRAt1 (a2) 0.105 0.122 0.405 0.870
(0.129) (0.161) (0.258)a (0.426) **
[0.119] [0.167] [0.262] [0.430]**
Government UCRt1 * IRA (a3) – 0.803 – 1.123
– (0.237) *** – (0.564) **
– [0.275]*** – [0.576]**
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
a1 + a3 – 0.281 2.075
– (0.183) (1.003)**
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 – 0.125 – 0.038
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 – 0.000 – 0.264
R squared 0.353 0.375 0.533 0.552
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 50 [353] 50 [353] 22 [93] 22 [93]
a p Value = 0.118.
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 13consistently with the typical negative outlook assigned to state-controlled firms (see Megginson and Netter, 2001). The re-
sult that market value of state controlled firms changes with the quality of domestic political institutions suggests that the
empirical evidence is not consistent with an efficiency hypothesis (see Section 3.1).
It is worth noting that the OECD Index of liberalization is significant in all columns, albeit with opposite signs: positive in
Columns (1) and (2) and negative in Columns (3) and (4). If one recalls that the index is lower when competition is tougher,
the implications of our findings are clear. Whenever checks and balances are weak, equity markets attach a premium to firms
that operate in less liberalized, more monopolistic markets where incumbents are more likely to be protected by the political
power. In contrast, where political constraints on the executive are stronger, it is competition and market openness that con-
vey value to firms.
In Table 6, we classify country-years observations based on electoral rules, as measured by the Disproportionality index.
Recall (see Section 3.3) that low values of the index indicate highly fragmented political systems and divided governments,
which, by making policy reversals more difficult, favor regulatory commitment (Levy and Spiller, 1994). In contrast, more
cohesive governments in majoritarian systems are expected to leave more room to interfere in regulatory decisions. In fact,
Disproportionality is negatively correlated with C&B, suggesting that checks and balances tend to be less strong in majorityPlease cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003
Table 6
The role of political institutions: electoral system – OLS estimates. Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book
ratio defined as (Total Assets  Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The Proportionality Index by Gallagher (1991), updated by
Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) is a continuous and time varying index of parliamentary fragmentation. The explanatory variables are defined in Section 4.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. Errors are clustered at firm (round parentheses) and
sector (square parentheses) level.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio Degree of electoral proportionality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low proportionality Low proportionality High proportionality High proportionality
Leveraget1 0.291 0.322 0.123 0.122
(0.143) ** (0.139) ** (0.294) (0.301)
[0.128]** [0.132]** [0.311] [0.319]
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.194 0.183 0.707 0.709
(0.153) (0.140) (0.493) (0.450)
[0.111]* [0.099]* [0.547] [0.500]
Log of real total assetst1 0.223 0.239 0.417 0.416
(0.102) ** (0.097) ** (0.156) *** (0.162) ***
[0.105]** [0.099]** [0.164]** [0.171]**
Investor Protectiont 0.019 0.003 0.103 0.103
(0.059) (0.057) (0.225) (0.222)
[0.044] [0.042] [0.308] [0.307]
GDP Growtht 0.002 0.015 0.041 0.041
(0.057) (0.054) (0.076) (0.074)
[0.066] [0.062] [0.083] [0.081]
Debt/GDPt 0.293 0.202 0.163 0.164
(0.939) (0.828) (0.759) (0.760)
[0.975] [0.836] [0.879] [0.882]
OECD Index of Liberalizationt 0.064 0.059 0.131 0.130
(0.058) (0.055) (0.063) ** (0.065) **
[0.033]* [0.033]* [0.075]* [0.074]*
Government UCRt1 (a1) 0.140 0.436 0.520 0.526
(0.197) (0.296) (0.442) (0.339)
[0.173] [0.262] [0.484] [0.371]
IRAt1 (a2) 0.154 0.019 0.0069 0.005
(0.104) (0.110) (0.163) (0.234)
[0.120] [0.104] [0.178] [0.259]
Government UCRt1 * IRA (a3) – 0.875 – 0.009
– (0.345) *** – (0.288)
– [0.266]*** – [0.316]
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
a1 + a3 – 0.440 – 0.517
– (0.210)** – (0.536)
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 – 0.036 – 0.335
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 – 0.006 – 0.938
R squared 0.379 0.393 0.477 0.477
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 38 [271] 38 [271] 26 [177] 26 [177]
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
14 B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxxrule systems. At the country level, we find that, on average, Denmark, Holland, Germany and Sweden score lower on the Dis-
proportionality Index, while, at the opposite end of the distribution, France has the highest score for the index, hence appear-
ing to be as the most majority rule oriented, and the UK, Greece and Italy also exhibit relatively higher indexes. Fig. 3 plots
the time trend of both Checks and Balances and Disproportionality for a subset of countries.
In Table 6, we report the results. In order to make comparisons with Table 5 easier, we have inverted the Disproportion-
ality Index so that high proportionality (hence high political fragmentation), by construction, can be interpreted similarly to
high checks and balances. We then use the 75th percentile value of the distribution of the Electoral Proportionality (EP) index
(28.5) as threshold to split the sample.
Our results show that the coefficient on the GovernmentUCR  IRA interaction in Column (2) is positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that when the IRA is in place, the larger the stake held by the state, the higher the firm’s market value,
in countries where parliament tends to be elected according to a majority rule, i.e., in countries with low levels of Electoral
Proportionality. In contrast, when we turn to more fragmented parliamentary systems which, in theory make either the deci-
sion process and policy reversals more difficult, the results show that residual state ownership of regulated firms is irrelevant
for firm value (see Columns (3) and (4)).Please cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003
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Fig. 3. Political indicators in selected EU countries. Checks & Balances – source: Beck et al. (2001) – and Gallagher Political Institutions Disproportionality Index
(source: Gallagher (1991) and Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008).
B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 15Similarly to Table 5, the OECD Index of liberalization enters with an opposite sign in the two sub-groups, confirming that
lack of competitive pressure is rewarded (punished) within less (more) fragmented political systems. When we consider the
overall impact of government ownership on firm value, whenever the IRA exists and political fragmentation is low, we find
that the sum a1 + a3  [IRA = 1] = 0.439 is significant with a p-value of 0.036 (in Table 5, with low checks and balances, the
total effect was 0.281, and the p-value was 0.125).
Overall the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that government ownership is conducive to higher market value only when
the institutional setting allows politicians to interfere in regulatory decisions.216.2. Instrumental variable results
In Section 3, we argued that state ownership should affect particularly firm value when political institutions allow gov-
ernments to intervene with formally independent regulators and discussed why state ownership and IRAs are potentially
endogenous in this relationship. We now look for more systematic evidence using instrumental variable estimation (two-
stage least squares, 2SLS) and rely on Checks and Balances, or Electoral Proportionality, to instrument Government UCR, IRA
and their interaction (Government UCR  IRA), along with other country-specific variables (Political Orientation, Government
Stability and Election Date). Because our statistical model is over-identified (we have more instruments than endogenous
variables), we then test the over-identifying restrictions and identify the impact of state ownership and IRA on firm value
by testing the exclusion restriction that Checks and Balances (or Electoral Proportionality) does not significantly enter in
the second stage estimation of firm market value, MTB (we perform a similar test also for the other instruments).
In Table 7.1, we present the first-stage regressions for Government UCR, IRA and their interaction when we include Checks
and Balances (Columns (1), (3) and (5)) and Electoral Proportionality (Columns (2), (4) and (6)) in the instrument sets. In Col-
umns (1) and (2), the negative coefficients on Political Orientation indicate that state ownership tends to be lower when the
government is more ‘‘right-wing’’, while the negative coefficients on Checks and Balances and Proportionality indicate that
privatizations tend to be more ‘‘reluctant’’ (i.e. Government UCR are larger) where the institutional constraints on discretion-
ary executive power are weaker. The results in Columns (3) and (4) suggest that the setting up of the IRAs was positively
associated with conservative governments and political fragmentation, and negatively correlated with checks and bal-
ances.22 More importantly from our point of view, Columns (5) and (6) show that, when the IRA is in place, residual state own-
ership (Government UCR  IRA) is significantly larger where institutional checks and balances are weaker and electoral21 In the Appendix, we report the results when the same estimation strategy is applied to the full sample, which includes also firms in utility sectors regulated
not by an independent authority, but by a branch of the government such as ministries or governmental committees. Our findings are very similar: when
checks and balances are low and party systems less fragmented, larger government stakes lead to higher firm value. We also re-estimate the market value
regressions for the sub-samples in the first quartile (very low quality) of the distributions of the political institutions indexes (to be contrasted with the results
from the sub-sample in the fourth quartile - very high quality). The results confirm that, as we predict, the market value of state controlled utilities is
significantly higher when they are regulated by IRAs that operate subject to weak political institutions. Results are available upon requests.
22 Indeed, because the inception of IRAs followed EU Directives, this relation is also influenced by the timing of the implementation of the norm.
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Table 7.1
Market-to-book and the role of political and institutional variables: First stage analysis. Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. Checks and Balances,
Proportionality Index, Political orientation, Election Date, Government Stability, and OECD Index of Liberalization are defined in Section 4. Firm and year
dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Government UCRt Government UCRt IRAt IRAt Government UCRt* IRA Government UCRt* IRA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Political Orientationt1 0.016** 0.006 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.001 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
Election Datet1 0.021 0.041 0.015 0.010 0.007 0.009
(0.034) (0.030) (0.099) (0.101) (0.034) (0.033)
Government Stabilityt1 0.018 0.020 0.003 0.029 0.018 0.019
(0.018) (0.017) (0.038) (0.036) (0.018) (0.018)
Checks & Balancest1 0.039** – 0.050a – 0.033** –
(0.016) – (0.031) – (0.015) –
Proportionality Indext1 – 0.034*** – 0.031** – 0.028***
– (0.007) – (0.015) – (0.007)
Additional instruments: Leverage, EBIT-Total Assets, Log Tot Assets, Investor protection, GDP growth
F Test (p value) 2.90 (0.000) 3.48 (0.000) 13.83 (0.000) 13.08 (0.000) 3.33 (0.000) 3.65 (0.000)
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 57 [449] 57 [449] 57 [449] 57 [449] 57 [449] 57 [449]
a p Value = 0.118.
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
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more reluctant to relinquish control over politically sensitive public utilities from which economic or financial rents can be ex-
tracted. Overall, the first-stage results suggest that, of all the used instruments, Checks and Balances and Electoral Proportionality
are possible determinants of the endogenous variables and, more to the point, are quite useful explanatory variables of the Gov-
ernment UCR  IRA interaction which, in the second stage, captures the impact of residual state ownership under the IRA.
In Table 7.2, we report second stage estimates. The instrument set alternates Checks and Balances in Column (1) and Elec-
toral Proportionality in Column (2). The 2SLS results show that Government UCR enters with a negative sign in both columns
(1) and (2), but is significant only in Column (2) while the coefficient on the IRA dummy is negative and significant in both
specifications. More importantly, the interaction Government UCR  IRA is positive and significant in all columns, which
supports our hypothesis that the presence of the government as a shareholder boosts the regulated firm’s value, providing
a sort of indirect protection that is apparently recognized and rewarded by the capital markets. The total effect of state own-
ership, when the IRA exists, is positive and significant in Column (1). The total effect of the IRA onmarket value (measured by
a2 + a3  GovernmentUCR) is positive for ownership stakes ranging from 30% to 40% while the sums of the coefficients are
highly significant in both columns.
We test the over-identifying restrictions by calculating the Sargan-Hansen for the full set of instruments as well as the
Difference-in-Sargan statistics for C&B (Column (1)) and EP (Column (2)) indices, which we use as instruments, along with
Political Orientation, Election date and Government Stability. Moreover, likewise Tabellini (2010), we also test the validity of
our exclusion restrictions by including C&B and EP directly in the regressions reported in Columns (3) and (4), respectively.
Comfortingly, the Hansen J-statistics suggests that the set of instrument we use in both specifications are valid and the
Difference-in-Sargan tests on C&B and EP indicate that they are individually valid instruments. In addition, at the bottom of
the table we also report the p-values of the exogeneity tests for each of the included instruments – firm, industry and country
control variables. Finally, in Columns (3) and (4) we further test the exclusion restrictions by entering C&B and EP as
regressors in the second stage regressions. As shown in the table, once included in the MTB regression, both variables are
statistically insignificant, while the main results remain unchanged.23
Consistently with the theoretical framework in Section 3, the empirical analysis shows that political institutions seem to
affect IRA regulated firms’ market value, but indirectly and primarily through the effect of residual government stakes in reg-
ulated firms.6.3. Robustness tests: endogenous liberalization and the role of culture
To check the robustness of our results, in this section we take into account the possible endogeneity of market liberaliza-
tion and we test the role of a country’s social capital and culture in establishing market regulation.
In Table 8 we report additional 2SLS estimates where we control for the potential endogeneity of the OECD Index of Lib-
eralization. Indeed, the decision to liberalize a market might be affected by the market power of incumbent firms as reflected23 We perform similar tests on Political Orientation, Government Stability and Election Date, by including them, one at the time, in the second stage regressions.
We found that none of them were statistically significant. Results are available upon request.
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Table 7.2
Market-to-book and the role of political and institutional variables: Second stage results and test of the exclusion restrictions. Sample of energy and telecom
regulated firms. 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets  Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/
Total Assets). The explanatory and instrumental variables are defined in Section 4. Checks & Balances is included as instrument in Col. 1 and as regressor in Col.
3. Proportionality Index is included as instrument in Col. 2 and as regressor in Col. 4. The Hansen J statistic tests the null of the validity of all instruments. For
the individual variables we report the difference-in-Sargan test that suspect regressors or instruments are exogenous. Firm and year dummies included. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio C&B as instrument Prop. Index as instrument C&B as regressor Prop. index as regressor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leveraget1 0.114 0.251* 0.271 0.325
(0.156) (0.066) (0.249) (0.235)
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.205* 0.189** 0.175* 0.174*
(0.108) (0.095) (0.104) (0.103)
Log of Real Total Assetst1 0.150** 0.227*** 0.239* 0.269**
(0.067) (0.066) (0.130) (0.112)
Investor Protectiont 0.054 0.046 0.014 0.013
(0.050) (0.046) (0.077) (0.096)
GDP Growtht 0.084** 0.107*** 0.114* 0.126*
(0.040) (0.041) (0.060) (0.068)
Debt/GDPt 0.470 0.224 0.104 0.341
(0.414) (0.458) (0.951) (0.578)
OECD Index of Liberalizationt 0.068 0.043 0.045 0.024
(0.045) (0.048) (0.058) (0.062)
Government UCRt (a1) 1.202 3.386** 4.151 4.380
(1.315) (1.651) (4.190) (3.187)
IRAt (a2) 0.824** 1.304*** 1.562 1.370**
(0.338) (0.507) (1.027) (0.592)
Government UCRt  IRA (a3) 3.133*** 3.496*** 3.799*** 3.388***
(0.986) (1.096) (1.358) (1.099)
Checks & Balancest1 – – 0.135 –
– – (0.175) –
Proportionality Indext1 – – – 0.037
– – – (0.091)
Firm dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Hansen J (all instruments) (p value) 0.639 0.857 0.799 0.806
C&B Index (Col.1)/Prop. Index (Col.2) (p value) 0.447 0.852 – –
Leverage (p value) 0.444 0.851 – –
EBIT-to-Total Assets (p value) 0.621 0.607 – –
Log of real Total Assets (p value) 0.634 0.646 – –
Investor protection (p value) 0.533 0.584 – –
GDP Growth (p value) 0.398 0.631 – –
Debt/GDP (p value) 0.945 0.579 – –
OECD Index of Liberalization (p value) 0.469 0.689 – –
F Test (p value) 5.79 (0.000) 5.67 (0.000) 5.25 (0.000) 4.97 (0.000)
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 57 [449] 57 [449] 57 [449] 57 [449]
a1 + a3 1.931* 0.110
(0.998) (0.974)
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 0.053 0.910 – –
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 0.006 0.005 – –
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 17in their market value: high market-to-book ratios might stem frommonopolistic rents due to barriers to entry, economies of
scale, or other factors that thwart competition in the industry. Hence, a government with a strong commitment to structural
reforms may decide to concentrate liberalization efforts in markets where firm value is relatively high. Alternatively, a pow-
erful incumbent may exert pressure on politicians to hinder or delay antitrust and regulatory interventions. To account for
this possible source of reverse causality, we endogenize also the OECD Index of Liberalization using the same instrumental
variables reported described in Section 6.2. The instrument set used for the IV estimates in Table 8 alternate, as in Table 7.2,
Checks and Balances in Column (1) and Electoral Proportionality in Column (2). As before, the results show that the IRA dummy
has a negative sign and is significant in both specifications, while the interaction Government UCR  IRA is positive and sig-
nificant in both columns.2424 Similar results obtain when we test the potential endogeneity of the Investor Protection index. Even in this case, the interaction term Government UCRIRA
remains positive and highly significant, confirming our main results. Results are available upon request.
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(2012) show that distrust in others, in markets and institutions generates demand for regulation since people prefer state
control rather than the entrepreneurial activity by people they do not trust. In particular, Aghion et al. (2010) find that
culture and institutions coevolve: culture affects institutions, and institutions affect culture. This symbiotic relation could
affect the interplay between government ownership of firms, regulation and the quality of political institutions so that the
prevailing culture in society could be an important omitted variable biasing our empirical analysis. To control partly for
this bias, we introduce a new country specific and time-varying variable, Distrust, drawn from the World Values Survey,
covering 1995 and the 1999–2003 waves.25 Our measure Distrust is derived from answers to the following question:
‘‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people in your country can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing
with people?’’. This index ranges from 0 (if the respondent answers ‘‘Most people can be trusted’’) to 1 (if she answers ‘‘I need
to be very careful’’). Results of IV estimates when Distrust is used as new instrument are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of
Table 8. In Column (3) we first test whether the Distrust variable has some direct impact on firm’s market-to-book value
introducing it as a regressor. Estimate in Column (3) shows that Distrust does not affect firm value directly. We then use
Distrust as an additional instrument (Column (4)), our interaction term Government UCR  IRA increases, while remaining
positive and statistically significant. The same holds for the sum a1 + a3  [IRA = 1] = 1.774. These results suggest that social
capital, or the lack thereof, could be an important factor affecting the link between residual stakes of state ownership and the
value of regulated firms.7. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we present the results of three sensitivity tests. In the first one, we employ an alternative political econ-
omy variable to proxy for the institutional constraints on discretionary executive power; in the second one, we check the
robustness of our results when we exclude UK firms, and in the third one, we use a threshold variable (the dummy
UCR30%) to define the firm-year ownership status of the firms instead of the continuous GovernmentUCR variable.
When one employs country specific variables meant to measure and compare characteristics of the institutional endow-
ments of many nations, one has to pay attention that these variables display enough variation over time. As shown by
descriptive statistics in Table 3 and in Fig. 3, both CB and EP exhibit considerable variation both across countries and over
time for our sample of EU member states. In addition, the two variables originate from two different databases, C&B con-
structed by the World Bank and EP originally designed, implemented and updated by political economy researches (Galla-
gher, 1991; Lijphart, 1999; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008). To provide a further check, we employ a third political economy
variable, the Political Constraints Index, POLCON-V, constructed by Henisz (2000, 2012), which measures the constraints on
political behavior imposed by the political institutions as well as by the credibility of the political system, such as the pres-
ence of separate legislative houses, the internal structure of the judiciary and federal institutions, and the effective systems
of checks and balances, etc. The main difference between Political Constraints (PC) and Checks and Balances is that the latter
assumes a linear relationship between the number of adjusted veto points and the degree of constraints on policy change,
while PC accounts for the diminishing marginal returns to the addition of veto players (Tsebelis, 2003) by allowing for the
alignment across branches of government that increases the feasibility of policy changes and reduces the level of political
constraints. Similarly to C&B and EP, also the Political Constraint Index varies over time thus allowing for institutional
changes.26
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9, the sample is split between ‘‘low’’ (PC less than 0.758, the 75th percentile of the index
distribution) and ‘‘high’’ (PC greater than 0.758) political constraints while in Column (3) we report the 2SLS estimate and in
Column (4) our test of the exclusion restriction (as in Table 7.2). Results confirm the evidence we have found in previous
tables: where the political constraints on government’s room for maneuver are weak, state ownership has a positive effect
on market-to-book ratios. In contrast, where PC is high, the GovernmentUCR  IRA interaction becomes insignificant (Column
(2)). When we account for endogeneity of GovernmentUCR and IRA using the PC index as additional instrument in the 2SLS
regression, we find that the interacted term is positive and highly significant and that the total effect of state ownership
when the IRA is in place is highly significant and quantitatively large (Columns (3) and (4)).
As noted in Section 2, from a country level perspective, the UK is the EU member state where the institutional reforms
started earlier. More precisely, in the UK, independent regulators for telecommunications, energy and water supply were
set up as early as in the Eighties and most firms were fully privatized even before. This peculiarity suggests that we check
the robustness of our results on a sample that excludes UK firms.
In Table 10, we re-estimate the model with the Government UCR  IRA interaction for the energy and telecom non-UK
firms (Column (1)), as well as for the sub-samples with low C&B and EP (Columns (2) and (3)) and with 2SLS (Column
(4)). Comfortingly, the results are very similar to those reported in Tables 5–7 thus supporting our predictions. In Column
(1) the OLS coefficient on the Government UCR  IRA interaction is positive and not far from significance (p-value = 0.11),25 For more details, see the web portal of the World Values Survey Association: www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
26 Initially, we intended to use an analogous variable taken from the POLITY-IV database, but we noticed that the XCONST (Executive constraints) variable did
not exhibit the sufficient time variation, possibly because the index is normalized for a longer period (since 1800) with respect to the World Bank C&B index
(since 1975) and POLCON-V (since 1960). Strausz (2011) indicates that Beck et al. (2001) and Henisz (2012) databases are appropriate variables to represent
political systems (p. 27).
Please cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
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Table 8
Endogenous liberalization and the effect of social capital on government regulation. Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. 2SLS estimates. The
dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets  Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory and
instrumental variables are defined in Section 4. Distrust is defined in Section 6.2. The Hansen J statistic tests the null of the validity of all instruments. For the
individual variables we report the difference-in-Sargan test that suspect regressors or instruments are exogenous. Firm and year dummies included. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio Market liberalization Distrust as regressor Distrust as instrument
C&B as instrument Prop. index as instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leveraget1 0.156 0.218 0.141 0.120
(0.151) (0.133) (0.150) (0.152)
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.153 0.141 0.187* 0.205*
(0.105) (0.105) (0.099) (0.107)
Log of real total assetst1 0.146** 0.182*** 0.165*** 0.157**
(0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Investor Protectiont 0.095 0.092 0.047 0.052
(0.074) (0.070) (0.048) (0.048)
GDP Growtht 0.076* 0.086** 0.086** 0.087**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.038) (0.040)
Debt/GDPt 0.588 0.462 0.587 0.452
(0.420) (0.408) (0.393) (0.413)
OECD Index of Liberalizationt 0.044 0.060 0.045 0.073
(0.067) (0.071) (0.043) (0.046)
Government UCRt (a1) 0.781 1.782 1.398 1.436
(1.373) (1.367) (1.348) (1.225)
IRAt (a2) 1.044** 1.209** 0.709** 0.811**
(0.470) (0.538) (0.346) (0.341)
Government UCRt  IRA (a3) 2.494*** 2.598** 2.980*** 3.211***
(0.987) (1.061) (0.920) (1.018)
Distrustt – – 1.403 –
– – (1.141) –
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a1 + a3 1.712** 0.816 1.582 1.774**
(0.814) (0.640) (1.063) (0.899)
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 0.036 0.202 0.137 0.049
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 0.018 0.022 0.003 0.004
Hansen J (all instruments) (p value) 0.731 0.598 0.545 0.743
Diff-in-Sargan: C&B/Prop Ind./Trust (p-Value) 0.538 0.539 0.587 0.569
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 57 [449] 57 [449] 57 [449] 57 [449]
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
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systems in Columns (2) and (3). When we turn to the IV results, we find that Government UCR  IRA is positive and highly
significant, which indicates that our results do not depend on the presence (or the absence) of a country, such as the UK
where privatization and liberalization reforms date back to the Eighties.
In the third robustness check, we replace the continuous ownership variable with a dummy. We thus use a plausible
threshold of state ownership and construct a dummy that equals 1 when the Government UCR are equal to or greater than
30%, to account for the fact that the state is likely to act as controlling shareholder even if it owns less than 50% of shares
(recall that 30% is the control threshold for the ‘‘Takeover Bid’’ Directive of the European Commission).
Table 11 reports the results from estimating the usual specification, except that the continuous GovernmentUCR variable is
replaced by the UCR30% dummy. We find that the presence of the state as a shareholder with (at least) a 30% stake positively
and significantly affects the market value, but only when we also take the quality of political institutions into account. In fact,
the positive effect of state ownership for IRA regulated firms is highly significant when checks and balances are weak and
electoral proportionality, as a proxy for political fragmentation is low (Columns (2) and (3) respectively) as well as when
we use 2SLS (Column (4)). Quite in line with our theoretical framework, in political contexts where governments wield
power to interfere with regulatory decisions, politicians may find it profitable to retain stakes in firms to benefit from the
advantages of a soft regulatory regime.Please cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003
Table 9
Robustness: market value, ownership and Political Constraints. Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book
ratio defined as (Total Assets  Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables are defined in Section 4. The Political
Constraints Index by Henisz (2000, 2012) measures the restrictions to the behavior of politicians imposed by the political institutions and by the credibility of
the political system. The Hansen J statistic tests the null of the validity of all instruments, the difference-in-Sargan tests that suspect regressors or instruments
are exogenous. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. Errors are clustered at firm (round
parentheses) and sector (square parentheses) level.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio (1) (2) (3) (4)
Low political constraints OLS High political constraints OLS I.V. I.V.
Leveraget1 0.016 0.049 0.075 0.290
(0.143) (0.299) (0.181) (0.353)
[0.151] [0.280] – –
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.280 0.751 0.210 0.163
(0.155)* (0.599) (0.119) * (0.108)
[0.134]** [0.640] – –
Log of Real Total Assetst1 0.226 0.174 0.127 0.232
(0.094) ** (0.113) (0.071) * (0.172)
[0.098] ** [0.110] – –
Investor Protectiont 0.016 0.001 0.060 0.066
(0.076) (0.068) (0.056) (0.051)
[0.075] [0.074] – –
GDP Growtht 0.009 0.121 0.083 0.117
(0.036) (0.088) (0.045) * (0.070) *
[0.038] [0.088] – –
Debt/GDPt 1.400 0.134 0.524 0.011
(0.500)*** (0.845) (0.452) (0.974)
[0.530] *** [0.846] – –
OECD Index of Liberalizationt 0.011 0.035 0.082 0.027
(0.047) (0.090) (0.046) * (0.080)
[0.043] [0.089] – –
Government UCRt1 (a1) 0.064 0.604 0.846 3.621
(0.223) (0.268) ** (1.748) (5.058)
[0.199] [0.276] ** – –
IRAt1 (a2) 0.047 0.165 0.732 1.271
(0.139) (0.222) (0.403) * (0.974)
[0.135] [0.220] – –
Government UCRt1 * IRAt1 (a3) 0.361 0.042 3.306*** 3.298
(0.188) * (0.426) (1.244) (1.069) ***
[0.188] * [0.460] –
Political Constraintt1 – – – 2.166
– – – (3.206)
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
a1 + a3 0.297* 0.646 2.460** –
(0.180) (0.559) (1.042) –
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 0.100 0.248 0.018 –
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 0.061 0.571 0.006 –
R squared 0.330 0.440 – –
F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J (all instruments) (p value) – – 0.598 0.434
Diff-in-Sargan: Pol. Con Index (p value) – – 0.391 –
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 44 [325] 21 [120] 57 [449] 57 [449]
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
20 B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxx8. Conclusions
Over the last 20 years and around the world, the regulation of utilities has been entrusted to independent agencies,
in order to improve market efficiency and tame the conflict of interest stemming from the dual role of the state as
owner and regulator. However, despite significant efforts and structural reforms, most utilities, in Europe and
elsewhere, are still owned and controlled by the state. Consequently, regulatory independence and residual state
ownership are intertwined institutional features that may affect firm operating and financial decisions, and ultimately
its market value.Please cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003
Table 10
Robustness: market value, ownership and IRA excluding UK firms. Sample of non-UK energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is theMarket-
to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets  Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables, C&B (Checks & Balances) and the
Proportionality Indexes are defined in Section 4. The Hansen J statistic tests the null of the validity of all instruments, The difference-in-Sargan tests that suspect
regressors or instruments are exogenous. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. Errors are
clustered at firm (round parentheses) and sector (square parentheses) level.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Low C&B OLS Low proportionality OLS I.V.
Leveraget1 0.068 0.044 0.349 0.014
(0.174) (0.130) (0.245) (0.232)
[0.165] [0.134] [0.205]* –
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.033 0.419 1.222 0.042
(0.467) (0.302) (0.703)* (0.556)
[0.477] [0.300] [0.632]* –
Log of real total assetst1 0.207 0.142 0.059 0.012
(0.103)** (0.056)** (0.081) (0.132)
[0.104]** [0.059]** [0.080] –
Investor Protectiont 0.057 0.060 0.050 0.069
(0.047) (0.042) (0.090) (0.064)
[0.035] [0.029]** [0.082] –
GDP Growtht 0.066 0.001 0.011 0.105
(0.043) (0.026) (0.043) (0.050)**
[0.042] [0.022] [0.039] –
Debt/GDPt 0.139 1.124 1.883 0.615
(0.512) (0.546)** (2.191) (0.514)
[0.621] [0.617]* [2.160] –
OECD Index of Liberalizationt 0.006 0.167 0.019 0.116
(0.068) (0.072)** (0.138) (0.074)
[0.065] [0.038]*** [0.129] –
Government UCRt1 (a1) 0.281 0.554 0.304 0.454
(0.219) (0.242)** (0.321) (1.164)
[0.232] [0.237]** [0.280] –
IRAt1 (a2) 0.070 0.206 0.007 0.951
(0.113) (0.133) (0.106) (0.380)**
[0.106] [0.144] [0.097] –
Government UCRt1 * IRAt1 (a3) 0.282 0.933 0.663 2.932
(0.176) (0.211)*** (0.370)* (1.192)**
[0.220] [0.212]*** [0.272]** –
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
a1 + a3 0.001 0.380** 0.355 2.478**
(0.278) (0.173) (0.224) (1.224)
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 0.996 0.028 0.109 0.043
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 0.022 0.000 0.046 0.038
R squared 0.307 0.384 0.408 –
F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J (all instruments) (p value) – – – 0.321
Diff-in-Sargan: Prop. Index (p value) – – – 0.406
N. firms [N. Obs.] 45 [341] 38 [245] 26 [163] 45 [341]
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 21In this paper, we have empirically studied the relationship between state ownership and firm value when com-
panies are subject to independent regulation. Using a large sample of European utilities, we show state ownership
is positively associated with firm value and that this relation surfaces in countries where weak checks and balances
and lower political fragmentation constrain less effectively executive power. Hence, where political institutions are
weak, politicians may interfere with regulatory agencies in order to give state-owned firms preferential treatment.
We label this regime reluctant regulation, a new concept contributing to explain why higher governments’ stakes
are associated with higher valuations, and why privatization is so often partial and incomplete in network indus-
tries. Under this regime, residual state ownership appears to be the main channel linking political institutions to
firm value.Please cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003
Table 11
Market value, IRA and government UCR at 30% threshold. Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio
defined as (Total Assets  Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). UCR30% is a dummy equal to 1 when the government controls 30% or
more of the firm’s UCR and is equal to 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables, C&B (Checks & Balances) and the Proportionality Indexes are defined in Section 4.
The Hansen J statistic tests the null of the validity of all instruments, The difference-in-Sargan tests that suspect regressors or instruments are exogenous.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. Errors are clustered at firm (round parentheses) and
sector (square parentheses) level.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Low C&B OLS Low proportionality OLS IV
Leveraget1 0.172 0.152 0.317 0.058
(0.129) (0.140) (0.138)** (0.191)
[0.121] [0.138] [0.126]** –
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.213 0.240 0.193 0.212
(0.126)* (0.134)* (0.145) (0.157)
[0.114]* [0.087]*** [0.096]** –
Log of real total assetst1 0.250 0.226 0.243 0.136
(0.088)*** (0.087)*** (0.097)** (0.083)*
[0.088]*** [0.082]*** [0.095]*** –
Investor Protectiont 0.032 0.043 0.004 0.066
(0.049) (0.051) (0.056) (0.064)
[0.031] [0.029] [0.040] –
GDP Growtht 0.045 0.035 0.001 0.075
(0.041) (0.023) (0.055) (0.057)
[0.041] [0.023] [0.059] –
Debt/GDPt 0.474 1.331 0.209 1.373
(0.481) (0.529)** (1.014) (0.929)
[0.556] [0.635]** [0.970] –
OECD Index of Liberalizationt 0.032 0.109 0.076 0.068
(0.051) (0.055)** (0.054) (0.063)
[0.042] [0.037]*** [0.029]*** –
UCR 30%t1 (a1) 0.079 0.226 0.227 0.796
(0.126) (0.169) (0.148) (1.007)
[0.133] [0.181] [0.132]* –
IRAt1 (a2) 0.026 0.057 0.083 1.008
(0.125) (0.175) (0.120) (0.423)**
[0.118] [0.174] [0.124] –
UCR 30%t1 * IRAt1 (a3) 0.083 0.498 0.518 2.603
(0.150) (0.172)*** (0.172)*** (0.981)***
[0.158] [0.187]*** [0.138]*** –
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.316 0.371 0.386 –
F test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a1 + a3 0.004 0.272** 0.290*** 1.808*
(0.202) (0.092) (0.107) (0.979)
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 0.984 0.032 0.007 0.065
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 0.446 0.000 0.001 0.042
Hansen J (all instruments) (p value) – – – 0.707
Diff-in-Sargan: Prop. Index (p value) – – – 0.545
N. firms [N. Obs.] 57 [449] 50 [353] 38 [271] 57 [424]
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
22 B. Bortolotti et al. / Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (2013) xxx–xxxOur results point toward possible regulatory failures in industrial systems dominated by state controlled incumbents
and characterized by reluctant regulation. Under such circumstances, the state may benefit from and share with private
shareholders an economic rent at the expense of consumers. Given the prevalence of state controlled utilities and the
strong power wielded by national governments, this conclusion raises concerns about the effectiveness of European
privatization and regulatory policy in network industries. To address the problem and therefore to make the recent
structural reforms on network industries more credible, national governments may push forward privatization to elim-
inate the potential conflict of interest, or improve regulatory institutions in the direction of increased independence and
public accountability. The analysis of the welfare effects of these policies is beyond the scope of this paper, but provides
fertile ground for further research.Please cite this article in press as: Bortolotti, B., et al. Reluctant regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jce.2012.12.003
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Appendix A
See Table A1.Table A1
Market value and ownership: the role of political institutions. Full sample: The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets  Book
Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables Checks & Balances and Electoral Proportionality are defined in Section4.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. Errors are clustered at firm (round parentheses) and
sector (square parentheses) level.
Dependent variable: MTB ratio Checks and balances Degree of electoral proportionality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low C&B High C&B Low proportionality High proportionality
Leveraget1 0.037 0.232 0.138 0.218
(0.116) (0.197) (0.113) (0.224)
[0.107] [0.196] [0.101] [0.213]
EBIT-to-Total Assetst1 0.208 0.947 0.207 0.926
(0.135) (0.675) (0.159) (0.465)**
[0.103]** [0.669] [0.126]* [0.479]*
Log of Real Total Assetst1 0.163 0.071 0.179 0.380
(0.079)** (0.193) (0.085)** (0.169)**
[0.076]** [0.192] [0.081]** [0.166]**
Investor Protectiont 0.034 0.127 0.031 0.354
(0.036) (0.155) (0.041) (0.191)*
[0.041] [0.162] [0.045] [0.233]
GDP Growtht 0.037 0.165 0.069 0.083
(0.027) (0.116) (0.041)* (0.075)
[0.029] [0.116] [0.046] [0.074]
Debt/GDPt 1.141 0.596 0.415 0.507
(0.518)** (0.827) (0.569) (0.772)
[0.564]** [0.848] [0.561] [0.841]
Government UCRt1 (a1) 0.410 0.435 0.433 0.530
(0.123)*** (0.454) (0.159)*** (0.355)
[0.142]*** [0.451] [0.166]*** [0.357]
IRAt1 (a2) 0.148 0.251 0.070 0.015
(0.100) (0.375) (0.083) (0.245)
[0.106] [0.376] [0.090] [0.246]
Government UCRt1  IRAt1 (a3) 0.757 0.049 1.012 0.290
(0.183)*** (0.625) (0.198)*** (0.347)
[0.225]*** [0.627] [0.201]*** [0.347]
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
a1 + a3 0.347** 0.484 0.579*** 0.240
(0.165) (0.894) (0.140) (0.583)
p-Value test on a1 + a3 = 0 0.035 0.588 0.000 0.679
p-Value test on a2 + a3 = 0 0.000 0.562 0.000 0.105
R squared 0.269 0.371 0.291 0.430
F Test (p value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80 [571] 27 [121] 66 [482] 31 [213]
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
*** Significance at 1%.
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